A Survey of New Power Struggles Emerging in Sudan

The ongoing civil war in Sudan erupted on April 15, 2023. This latest conflict has once again proved the instability of the Sudanese government after the 2019 coup, and even during the 2011 Arab Spring. In sum, internal conflicts between foreign interests, warlords, and commercial powers have dramatically bled into the world’s political stage. This war is not unprecedented and has roots in previous, unresolved points of contention within Sudan. It precipitated the post-Colonial dominance of military elites in the Sudanese nation; strongmen and populist pundits have long battled for power in the former British colony. This latest iteration of a phenotypical Sahelian conflict has pitted two major powers against each other, despite their previous and albeit uneasy alliance. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, is seeking to reassert itself over the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, a near-legendary figure referred to as the diminutive form of Mohamed, Hemedti. Their rivalry, sparking one of the bloodiest conflicts of this decade, has plunged Sudan into “one of the region’s many proxy conflicts” (Salih, 6). It has been characterized by immense human suffering and has been perpetuated by the aforementioned interests.

The immediate historical context that set the stage for the war is centered on the demise of the 30-year long rule of the Islamist military leader Omar al-Bashir (not to be confused with the Ba’athist Bashar al-Assad of comparable brutality). His regime was characterized by its response to the few rebellions in Sudan’s marginalized peripheries, notably the western Darfur region. It was the context in which the notorious RSF was created, originating from the Janjaweed militias (literally the horseback devils), which were “notorious for their role in the Darfur conflict” in the early 2000s (EUAA). Bashir formalized this militia in 2013 from their origins of disjointed, tribal ethnically Arab gangs which terrorized the Black population of western Sudan, which were not Arabs like the rest of the country. This racialized persecution of black peoples who had lived there far before the advent of Islam allowed for a radical othering of an entire racial group. The Janjaweed, now the RSF, was now empowered by Bashir to seize significant “gold mines and other assets” (Gunning, 200), which allowed the organization to become a pawn to spar with other security agencies, opening a pandora’s box of smuggling as the rule of law decayed. Then, in 2019, a “beacon of opportunity” (Gunning) was a coalescence of a united political front of elites and a substantial popular backing of anything anti-Bashir; as a result, there were “nonstop street protests” (Gunning) which forced out Bashir. This provided a brief window of optimism regarding democracy in Sudan. However, the military elite, driven by self-preservation, quickly filled the power vacuum instead of allowing a civilian government to form. The transition period, 2019-2023, was characterized by a precarious power-sharing arrangement between military elites and a weak transitional government. This government was quickly undone by elites, as factions determined that contributing to a civilian transitional government, would in fact democratize their country. As a result, the elites’ fixation on an “accommodating stance” of their factions ultimately “hamstrung the country’s democratic prospects” (Gunning). Such a hamstring culminated in the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, which enshrined the right of rebel movements to retain their arms, which effectively taught them that “peacemaking can enhance rather than diminish violence’s value” (Srinivasan). Instead of bringing stability, the JPA “became a lever that enabled the Sudanese military to undermine that very government, laying the groundwork for the 2021 coup” (Craze and Khair). As such, the SAF and RSF generals seized power from the weak civilian government in the October 2021 coup, the sixth coup since independence. While protesters fiercely resisted, the derailed transition could not get back on track. The military succeeded in its “counter-revolutionary playbook” (Grewal) which “dismantl[ed] any structural changes achieved by a revolutionary movement and the redoubled repression used to crush such a challenge” (Allinson). The twin seizors plunged the country into a civil war as there was a fundamental “power struggle over control of key military and political institutions” between Burhan and Hemedti (Gunning). This dispute centered on what was expected to be an inevitable integration of the RSF into the SAF. The deal to return to a civilian government was “hanging in the balance” (Gunning) as such a prospect would ideally quell another dimension of conflict within Sudan. However, such a merger never occurred; Hemedti could not advance himself in such a scenario as he was already the second-hand man to Burhan, limiting his political maneuverability. Hemedti was a poor Sudanese peasant, and rose up the Janjaweed ranks, eventually gaining Bashir’s favor as a result of his political saviness and his portion of the RSF’s demonstrated brutality and seeming to remain on the right side of whichever ruling power in place at any given time. Hemedti’s cult of personality enabled him to reach a position in which the only force holding him back was the very SAF that he helped attain power in 2021. The resulting splinter sparked all out war, which has been called the “war of the generals” (Gunning). This has distinguished this particular conflict from those previous, as previously wars were fought on ethnic lines. But as is common with the Sahel, battles fought along ethnic lines are quickly commandeered by foreign and commercial interests. The destruction has been demonstrably immense. Suffering is on a level unqualifiable with verbiage; a report by the Sudanese Doctors Syndicate claimed that the number of infant deaths due to malnutrition had reached 522,000 on January 18, 2025. The report then went on to detail that Darfur witnessed the death of 45,000 children due to malnutrition. Further, there were 54 cases of tuberculosis among children in areas of South Kordofan. In the same report, UNICEF said that 3.2 million children under the age of five will face “various forms of malnutrition during 2025”. Those were the last figures available online as to the civilian death toll. Death tolls of various methodologies and qualifications for a war-related death have suggested a death toll ranging from 40,000 to 400,000. 25,000,000 people face acute food insecurity, over half of the country’s population (Congress.gov). The RSF is responsible for approximately 80% of documented Conflict-relatied sexual violence (CSRV) cases. There are reports of CSRV being used as an ethnic cleansing tool against non-Arab groups, particularly in the Darfur. Children as young as one year old have been reported among the countless survivors of CSRV (UNICEF). Of the 24,000,000 children in Sudan, 17,000,000 are reportedly out of school. Sudan has contributed 3,900,000 forced migrants in early 2025 having left Sudan, and another 8,500,000 being internally displaced within Sudan (Congress.gov). Satellite imaging has uncovered swaths of desert sands dyed a deep crimson color in and around Al-Fashir, a Darfuri city which fell to the RSF on October 26, 2025. Two days afterward, ABC News reported that the RSF had already executed 2,000 people; men, women, children, and the elderly. The fate of the other ~260,000 Al-Fashiris is uncertain as of the time of writing (11/5/2025). Again, the war (paired with what has been described of as a genocide of non-Arab populations) is ever-changing with reputable figures for death tolls and other data points are virtually impossible to collect. This, as previously stated as being a phenotypical Sahelian war, is enabled by a vast array of interests. 

The conflict is deeply entrenched in powerful commercial interests, which drive the combatants, embolden foreign backers, and provide a strong incentive for the conflict to continue. The primary factions, the SAF and RSF, are not mere forces but best thought of as “key economic and political actors” (Gunning). They are propped up by corporate interests and extensive business empires which were directly threatened by the prospect of a democratic Sudan. The RSF’s economic engine is rooted in its “complex financial network controlling the gold market” (EUAA). Hemedti rose “from an uneducated trader to one of the wealthiest men in Sudan under [Bashir’s] rule” (Malik), leveraging the dictator’s patronage to become a business tycoon with overseas financial links, primarily trading in gold (the decade’s blood diamond, in essence). The gold supply was critical, as Russia “reportedly benefited from gold smuggled from Sudan to help finance its invasion of Ukraine and circumvent sanctions” (Brahimi). The SAF also maintains a massive economic footprint. The army “oversees a network of national and international companies across various sectors, including defence, agriculture, banking, mining, transport, construction, and private security” (Nashed). The prospect of a civilian government demanding control over these resources and implementing oversight of military budgets was viewed by the generals as being an existential threat; “lives, their fortunes, and their status” (Gunning) could likely be imperiled by a state vying for less oligarchic governance. This naturally created an “empowered military” that “will attempt to subvert the democratic transition” (Grewal). Beyond these interests, the UAE is heavily invested in Sudan’s economic potential, holding significant stakes in the country’s “agricultural and mineral resources, many of which are untapped, including gold” (Tester). Further, Sudan’s geographic position places it between the flash point that is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which threatens Egypt’s economy and livelihood downstream. Further, Sudan is situated between the existing humanitarian crises in the totalitarian Eritrean state, the perennial Tigray conflicts, and the constant stream of forced migrants from sub-Saharan Africa working their ways towards the Mediterranean coast. In addition, Sudan possesses a critical shoreline on the Red Sea, through which “around a third of global container traffic passes” (EUAA). This complex web of economic and geopolitical interest creates high stakes for stability in Sudan, with countless actors realizing that they are poised to enter a smuggling market as a government decays. As such, RSF-aligned powers appear content with the current black box that is the Sudanese market; “As long as each coalition’s area of control remains largely set, the kinds of economic activities important to these patrons can proceed without the bother of negotiating a politically difficult resolution”. Thus, foreign backers “maintain lucrative supply lines without the burdens associated with doing business in a legitimate state (such as regulations and tariffs) or popular protests against resource extraction that benefits a small elite” (Hassan, Kodouba). In sum, a stable government is simply undesirable to foreign profiteers. 

These profiteers contribute to an “extensive foreign involvement, complicating peace efforts and deepening the humanitarian crisis” (Salih). Far from being an isolated domestic struggle, ten countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia could be credited for having involvement in the war. This support provides “both sides with resources and legitimacy,” leading to “prolonged and intensified fighting (Ray). The supporters of the Sudanese Armed Forces are as follows; Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Qatar, and recently both Russia and Ukraine (Salih). Egypt is a supporter due to “historical reasons” (Salih such as the fact that the SAF and Egyptian armies were once founded as one body during British colonial administration, and they also bear concerns over “potential spillover effects and the security of the Nile River resources” (Hassan, Kobouda). Iran has restored relations with the SAF and has supplied advanced drones, such as the “Mujahir-6 drones, which helped push the RSF out of Omdurman’s strategic locations” (Salih). The House of Saud, traditionally sparring with the Islamic Republic of Iran, views “Sudan as a crucial ally against Iranian influence in the region” (Salih) despite Iran’s current support of the SAF. Turkiye has “reportedly offered its famous Bayraktar drones to the army” (Salih). Russia, in a recent pivot away from the RSF, has aligned itself with the SAF as to gain leverage in a deal to establish a Russian naval base on the Red Sea near Port Sudan, offering “unrestricted qualitative military aid” (Jamestown Foundation) while the Wagner Corps, a Russian mercenary group fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine, still back the RSF with its Africa Corps, infamous across the Sahel. As such, Ukraine supports the SAF alongside Russia “in light of its opposition to the Wagner group” (Salih). Supporting the RSF is a local host of states, such as Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya, and notably the UAE (Salih). Chad has been accused of “facilitating and delivering weapons from the UAE using its eastern airports in the cities of Abeche and Um-Djaras”, and the UN has independently confirmed that weapons are coming from the UAE to the RSF (Salih). Libya backs the RSF with cash, as the RSF is engaged in mercenary operations in Libya, which contributed to its “cash windfall that let it recruit in numbers to rival the size of the national army” (Hudson).The UAE is perhaps the “most prominent state to intervene” (Tester). They provide “substantial financial assistance and military supplies to the RSF” (Ray) due to Hemedti’s alignment with their regional ambitions and economic interests. The UAE has been “named by UN sanctions monitors as backing the RSF” (Tester). The UAE is allegedly smuggling weapons “using humanitarian aid as cover” (Walsh, Koettl, Schmitt). There exists a “complex network of supply lines and alliances across neighboring Libya, Chad, Uganda, and breakaway regions of Somalia” (Tester) which feeds Hemedti’s war machine. The ideological hostility by the UAE stems from the SAF’s “longstanding links to political Islam dating from the Bashir era” (Tester). The collective impact of this external support emboldens the warring parties, leading them to believe that “they can win on the battlefield” (DiCarlo) despite the current stalemate. The influx of arms, including “Chinese-made weaponry identified by Amnesty International, as well as drones and armored vehicles from the UAE” (Tester) and the financial aid sustains devastating military campaigns, including what many describe as a campaign of ethnic cleansing or even genocide in the Darfur two decades after the first genocide. 

The Sudanese civil war is a tragic study of a script dictated for African states by foreign powers. The prospect of democratic rule has constantly been trampled on since Sudan’s independence in 1956, and it began as yet another power struggle between elites that spilled over into Khartoum state and has engulfed the entire country. The war seems to have no ideological grounding, with the UAE, Russia, and Egypt dictating the armed forces which threaten minorities, women, and children. This mirrors a catastrophic security dilemma, in which no one except the people benefits from peace and stability. This places Sudan with failed states such as the DR Congo, being forever in a loop of insurrection and extraction. This was all propelled by elitist self-preservation in Sudan, and the cost has been immeasurable, both literally and figuratively. Instability has opened the floodgates to hundreds of thousands of deaths, rapes, and executions. What is next for Sudan can not be predicted; but the stakes are high, as the remainder of the pre-war 46 million Sudanese people look down the barrel of perpetual warfare, an abyss of interminable violence and famine.